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In this paper, I analyze the optimal choice of board of directors using the dual-
role model of boards in Adams and Ferreira (2007). In my model, shareholders
choose either an informed board that brings additional private information to the
firm or an uninformed board that merely considers the inside information already
available within the firm. The board then randomly chooses a good chief executive
officer (CEO) with inside information or a bad CEO without such information, and
the CEO decides whether to consult with the board when making a project decision.
I show that shareholders generally choose the informed board to maximize firm value
by utilizing the private information available to the board. However, the sharehold-
ers optimally select the uninformed board if the CEO is reluctant to communicate
with the informed board for fear it will reject the CEO’s decision. The uninformed
board is also optimal when the board has a sufficiently large private benefit of mon-
itoring the CEO, the shareholders feel burdened by any conflict between the CEO
and the board, or the firm is involved in many unrelated businesses, especially when
the inside information is valuable and the firm needs many outsiders to observe use-
ful outside information. I use some of these implications and casual observation of
real-world data to discuss recent trends in the board structure of Japanese firms.
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The role of corporate boards of directors has become a central issue in finance in the
wake of recent corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, and others).1 In the US,
the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 requires all firms listed on national exchanges to
have a majority of independent board members, and similar laws have been introduced in
many other countries, including Canada (C-SOX in 2002), France (the Financial Security
Law of Finance in 2003), and Germany (the German Corporate Governance Code in
2002).2 The worldwide trend is now toward the requirement for listed companies to
appoint independent board members.
In Japan, the revision of the Commercial Code in 2003 allowed firms to adopt a
US-style board system, or so-called “committees system,” which strengthened the mon-
itoring role of boards and substantially differs from the traditional Japanese “audit and
supervisory (Kansayaku)” system.3 In brief, a company has three committees consist-
ing of board members (Committee on Nomination of Directors, Committee on Fees for
Management Members, and Audit Committee), and each of these committees is required
by law to have a majority of outside directors. Further, with the committees system,
there is a clear separation between the board’s supervisory function and company man-
agement in that the board of directors specializes in the supervisory role and delegates
the management of the company to its executive officers.4 In contrast, a company us-
ing the “Kansayaku” system does not have this clear distinction between supervision
and management because all board members are involved in both roles. In this system,
the activities of the board are supervised by an audit and supervisory board known as
the Kansayaku of which a majority of its members must be outsiders. However, the
appointment of outside Kansayaku members is not mandatory, and importantly, the
Kansayaku has only limited power to supervise management because its members do
not carry voting rights in board meetings.5
1Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), and John and Senbet (1998)
provide comprehensive surveys of theoretical and empirical studies on corporate governance and boards.
Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) also reviews the recent state of corporate governance research.
2Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) investigates the effects of SOX on the supply and demand for
directors, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) examines the value effects of the announcement of the
SOX, and Brick and Chidambaran (2010) conclude that the independence of board committees increased
following the enactment of the SOX Act.
3The revision of the Commercial Code allowed only large firms with total capital in excess of 100
million yen to select the committees system. Subsequently, the enactment of the Japanese Companies
Act in 2005 allowed all firms this option.
4The Companies Act Article 2 (xv) defines an “outside director” as the director of any stock company
who is neither an executive director nor an executive officer, nor an employee, including managers, of
such stock company or any of its subsidiaries, and who has neither ever served in the past as an executive
director nor executive officer, nor as an employee, including a manager, of such stock company or any
of its subsidiaries.
5In May 2015, another type of the board system known as the audit and supervisory committee
system (or “Kansa” committee) was introduced in Japan. Firms can themselves choose to have this
committee consisting of at least three directors, of which the majority must be outside directors. In
general, the Kansa committee has less monitoring power than the committees system, but has greater
monitoring power than the traditional Kansayaku system.
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In light of these developments, modern corporate governance in Japan has several
distinct features. First, almost all Japanese firms are reluctant to choose the committees
system. Of the companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), only 69 (56 in
the First Section, 4 in the Second Section, 2 in the Mothers, and 7 on the JASDAQ)
currently use the committees system as at May 2, 2016 according to the Japan Audit &
Supervisory Board Members Association. Although several well-known Japanese firms
such as Sony, Nomura Holdings, and Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group have adopted
the committees system, 98.02% of TSE firms have not. Second, a large number of
Japanese firms, including Kansayaku firms, have been rapidly increasing the number
of outsiders on their boards in recent years, although the number of outside directors
remains relatively small when compared with US companies. In evidence, the percentage
of firms with any board outsider increased from 42.3% to 64.4% (40.8% to 63.8% for
Kansayaku firms) from October 2006 to May 2016, while the percentage of firms with
outsiders representing at least one-third of board members increased from 10.7% to
22.0% (8.8% to 20.5% for Kansayaku firms) from September 2010 to May 2016.6 Third,
there is great variability in the willingness to hire outside directors among Kansayaku
firms. As discussed, in recent years Japanese firms have been generally hiring more
outside directors, despite most not adopting the committees system. However, there are
still many TSE firms with few outsiders on their boards. In fact, as at May 2016, 247
TSE-listed firms do not have any board outsiders and another 1,368 TSE-listed firms
have only a single board outsider.
The questions are why Japanese firms choose not to adopt the committees system,
and why many Kansayaku firms have continued to increase the number of their outside
board directors while others have not. We can respond to some of these questions by
investigating the reasons why firms wish or do not wish to have outside board members.
Of course, the fact that many firms are apparently unwilling to implement an indepen-
dent board is somewhat puzzling from the viewpoint of firm value maximization. For
instance, it is widely believed that independent directors are beneficial for shareholder
value, and several empirical studies (e.g., Byrd and Hickman (1992), Nguyen and Nielsen
(2010), and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990)) provide evidence consistent with this view-
point.7 More recently, Bhagat and Bolton (2013) conclude a positive and significant
relationship between board independence and operating performance following the en-
actment of the SOX Act, and Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) also show that
board independence exerts a positive effect on firm value and operating performance af-
ter controlling for endogeneity problems using local director pools as an instrument for
board independence.8 More importantly, the appointment of outside directors can bring
6The May 2016 statistics are based on data retrieved from a corporate governance information search
on May 7, 2016 of the TSE website, while the other statistics are from TSE (2013).
7Conversely, some empirical studies report that the value effects of independent directors are not
significant and sometimes even negative (see Nguyen and Nielsen (2010)).
8Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) also examines the effects of the appointment of CEOs as outside
directors, and Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) show that the effectiveness of outside directors
depends on the cost of acquiring information about the firm. Perry and Shivdasani (2005) considers
the restructuring process of firms with a majority of outsiders. In addition, Saito (2011) empirically
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valuable outside information not available to insiders into the firm’s decision-making
processes. For example, Baranchuk and Dybvig (2006) develop a model predicting that
boards perform better by including some directors who can bring information to the
board, even if they have conflicts of interest with the other directors. Some also argue
that outsiders generally have less information about the firm than do insiders, and thus
cannot effectively monitor the CEO. In this regard, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) empir-
ically examine the trading performance of independent directors and show that they do
indeed have sufficient inside information about the firm.
To address the reasons why many firms prefer inside directors who have only private
information available from within the firm (hereafter “inside information”) and do not
bring any additional private information from outside the firm (“outside information”)
to the firm, I analyze a model of the optimal choice of boards using the framework
developed by Adams and Ferreira (2007), and investigate how private information held
by the board and the CEO affects the shareholders’ choice as to whether or not to adopt a
board with superior information. Adams and Ferreira (2007) model the board’s advising
and monitoring roles and analyze how the board’s endogenous monitoring intensity cost
is determined. In their model, if the CEO discloses information about his project choice
to the board, he can receive advice, but can also be monitored more intensively by
the board.9 Their model predicts that it can be optimal for shareholders to increase
monitoring intensity cost given that the CEOmay be reluctant to share information if the
board can easily overturn the CEO’s decision. My model also relates to optimal corporate
control as in Harris and Raviv (2010, 2008, 2005) in which different parties within the
firm (e.g., shareholders, management, and the board) privately observe different private
information about the firm’s decisions. For example, Harris and Raviv (2008) show
that shareholders can be better off with an insider-controlled board when these insiders
have valuable information relative to that of outsiders, even if there is an agency cost
associated with insider control.10
My model extends the dual-role model in Adams and Ferreira (2007) in four ways.
First, shareholders choose between an informed board and an uninformed board. If
the CEO discloses his project choice to the board, the informed board observes not
only inside information but also outside information about the project. In a real-world
situation, if the board has a majority of outsiders, it can use additional information
investigates the boards of Japanese firms and finds that outside directors have favorable effects on firm
value.
9Recently, many studies have examined the board’s dual role. For example, Schwartz-Ziv and Weis-
bach (2013) analyze the minutes of board meetings in Israeli companies and find that boards are active
monitors that play both a monitoring and an advising role. Elsewhere, Linck et al. (2008) show that
board structure is consistent with the costs and benefits of the board’s dual role. Faleye, Hoitash, and
Hoitash (2011) also investigate the link between the intensity of board monitoring and the performance
of directors.
10Their models are based on Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Dessein (2002). Other theoretical studies
that analyze corporate governance and boards include Almazan and Suarez (2003), Baldenius (2013),
Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan
(2008), Inderst and Mueller (2010), Malenko (2013), Raheja (2005), Song and Thakor (2006), Wagner
(2011), and Warther (1998).
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brought in by outsiders along with the information some insiders can access within the
firm. In contrast, I assume the uninformed board observes only inside information and
is unable to access any additional information outsiders may know. Second, the board
randomly hires either a good CEO or a bad CEO because it cannot distinguish between
good and bad CEOs prior to hiring. The good CEO observes inside information, but
the bad CEO does not observe any private information. In Japan, for instance, inside
board members tend to elect a firm’s CEO from their own pool of members. If an
elected CEO knows inside information about the project by chance, he can use it during
the decision-making process. However, if an elected CEO is uninformed, he cannot use
inside information unless he consults with the board, which may have some informed
members. I assume that the CEO type becomes public soon after hiring, and the board
then uses information about the type of the CEO to decide whether to turn down the
CEO’s decision. Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist (2013) find empirical evidence that
boards can learn about the CEO’s quality by gathering soft along with hard information.
Third, I assume that both the CEO and the board derive some private benefit from taking
control over the project. Each of them may be able to establish a good reputation by
making important decisions regarding a firm’s projects, which may assist them to secure
advantageous positions in the future. Finally, in extended models, I analyze how the
shareholders’ cost associated with disagreement between the board and the CEO as well
as firm diversification affect the choice of board, neither of which has been investigated
theoretically in past studies.
My main findings are as follows. First, the shareholders generally choose the in-
formed board to maximize firm value if the informed board’s monitoring intensity cost
is sufficiently large. That is, if the cost of monitoring intensity is large enough, the
CEO is willing to communicate with the informed board to obtain advice because he
knows that the informed board has little incentive to turn down his decision, and the
shareholders can optimally choose the informed board to take advantage of its outside
information. However, the shareholders optimally choose the uninformed board when
the monitoring intensity cost of the informed board is sufficiently small. In this situation,
both good and bad CEOs are reluctant to consult with the informed board, which is
also the stricter monitor, given the fear of losing control over the project decision. The
bad CEO who does not have inside information, however, has ample incentive to consult
with the “uninformed board,” even though the good CEO obtains no benefit from such
consultation. Therefore, the shareholders choose the uninformed board intentionally to
induce the bad CEO to reveal his project choice to the board. The uninformed board
then becomes optimal, especially when the probability of hiring the bad CEO is high
and the inside information is valuable. In support, several studies (e.g., Fracassi and
Tate (2012), Shivdasani and Yermack (1999)) find that the CEO is willing to appoint
less-independent directors or directors tied to the CEO when the CEO is involved in
the selection of board members, even if such a decision reduces firm value. It is then
possible that shareholders accept the hiring of insider directors because they also wish
to appoint insiders to help the CEO communicate with the board.
Second, the shareholders also choose the uninformed board if the board derives a
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large private benefit of making decisions on the firm’s project. In this situation, the
informed board is eager to reject the CEO’s decision to satisfy its own private benefit,
even if it fails to obtain any private information regarding the project. Because the
informed board’s decision can harm firm value, it can be optimal for the shareholders
to choose an uninformed board that has less incentive to overturn the CEO’s decision.
Third, the shareholders choose the uninformed board if the shareholders’ cost associated
with disagreement between the board and the CEO is sufficiently large. By choosing
the uninformed board, which is generally friendlier to the CEO, the shareholders can
reduce the risk of conflict between the board and the CEO. Finally, the uninformed
board can also be optimal for a diversified firm with many unrelated businesses. In such
a firm, a potential CEO and inside board members may have only a limited piece of
inside information. If so, the firm may be better off choosing the uninformed board with
many insiders to collect inside information through having directors from each business
unit rather than choosing the informed board that can observe outside information, but
may not produce enough inside information. This situation is likely to arise especially
when the firm is involved in many businesses, the inside information is valuable, and the
board size is relatively small compared with the number of outsiders the firm needs to
have to obtain useful outside information.
In addition to these theoretical findings, I also provide an overview of the board
structure of TSE-listed firms through casual observation. More specifically, I examine
the relationship between the presence of foreign shareholders and board structure as well
as the board structure by industry sector. I find that the firms with higher shares of
foreign shareholders tend to have a larger number of outside directors on their boards.
This finding is consistent with the implication of my model in that foreign shareholders
typically have a smaller shareholders’ cost associated with disagreement between the
board and the CEO. In addition, I find that the number of board outsiders differs sub-
stantially by industry sector. Consistent with some of the model’s implications, firms
engaging in specialized businesses (e.g., financial, real estate, and pharmaceutical com-
panies) tend to have a greater number of outside directors than those involved in many
different businesses employing highly technological skills (e.g., machinery, automobile,
and chemical companies).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the timing
of the model and each player’s preferences. Section 3 solves the model backwardly
and analyzes the board’s advising and monitoring decisions, the CEO’s decision about
whether to reveal project choice to the board, and the shareholders’ optimal choice of
board. Section 4 analyzes the two extended models with regard to shareholders’ cost and
firm diversification. Section 5 applies some of the model implications to recent trends in
the board structure of TSE firms. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 The Model
2.1 Timing of the Model
t = 0
- Shareholders choose an informed
- Board hires a good CEO with
t = 1
- CEO selects a project and decides
- Good CEO observes p˜.
- Informed board observes a˜ and p˜
t = 2
- Board decides upon
- Board advices the CEO with
or takes control of the project decision
or an uninformed board.
a probability of q, or a bad CEO
whether to reveal it to the board.
and uninformed board observes p˜
only if the board knows the project.
the monitoring intensity π.
a probability of 1− π (and
t = 3
- Firm is liquidated.
with a probability of π.
with a probability of 1− q. the CEO makes the project decision)
Figure 1. Timeline in the model.
Figure 1 depicts the timeline in the model. There are four periods: t = 0, t = 1,
t = 2, and t = 3. At t = 0, shareholders choose either an informed board (H) that
can potentially generate outside information (not known to the CEO) about the firm’s
project, or an uninformed board (L) that can observe only inside information that is
already available within the firm. The board type is public information known to the
shareholders and the CEO. In a real world situation, we would expect a board with a
majority of outsiders to acquire not only the information available inside the firm, but
also some additional information not available to insiders. I assume that the uninformed
board can also acquire inside information, as it is natural to think that some if not all
insiders observe private information available within the firm and share it with the other
board members. The selected board then hires either a good CEO (G) or a bad CEO
(B). However, the board cannot distinguish between good and bad CEOs during the
hiring process, but only knows the probability of hiring a good or bad CEO. The board
can select a good CEO with a probability of q ∈ [0, 1] and a bad CEO with a probability
of 1− q. The type of the CEO is revealed to the board soon after hiring.
At t = 1, the CEO selects a project from an infinite number of feasible projects
θ ∈ R. The good CEO privately observes inside information p˜ about the project, which
is uniformly distributed on [0, P ] (P ∈ (0, 1]), while the bad CEO does not. Then the
CEO decides whether to reveal his project choice θ to the board. If the CEO reveals
θ, the board can also observe private information about the project. The informed
board privately observes not only p˜, but also outside information a˜ about the project,
which is uniformly distributed on [0, A] (A ∈ (0, 1]). On the other hand, the uninformed
board privately observes only p˜, which is the same inside information possessed by the
good CEO. If the CEO does not communicate θ with the board, both the informed
and uninformed boards cannot observe any private information because they cannot
identify the choice of the project. The random variables a˜ and p˜ are independent, and
the variances of these random variables σ2a and σ
2
p measure the importance of outside
information, and that of inside information.
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At t = 2, the board decides its monitoring intensity pi ∈ [0, 1]. With a probability of
pi, the board successfully monitors the CEO and has effective control over the project
decision. With a probability of 1 − pi, the board provides advice to the CEO on the
project instead of opposing the CEO’s decision. That is, the board sends a signal s
about a˜ and/or a signal s ′ about p˜ to the CEO, and the CEO retains the right to decide
on the project. At this stage, the board knows the type of CEO and thus can set a
different monitoring intensity depending on the CEO type. The firm is liquidated at
t = 3.
2.2 Preferences
After the CEO selects a project θ, either the CEO or the board must make a decision
in choosing y = (ya, yp) ∈ R2. The loss in firm value is divided into two parts: the loss
resulting from the deviation of the decision yp from the realization of inside information
p˜, and the loss resulting from the deviation of the decision ya from the realization of
outside information a˜. Specifically, the loss in value function is given by:
(yp − p˜)2 + (ya − a˜)2. (1)
Firm value is maximized by choosing a decision, ya = a˜ and yp = p˜. As explained in the
previous subsection, the good CEO privately observes a˜, while the informed (uninformed)
board can privately observe both a˜ and p˜ (only p˜), but only if the CEO reveals his choice
of project at t = 1.
I assume the following utility function represents the shareholders’ preferences.
US = −[(yp − p˜)2 + (ya − a˜)2]. (2)
In this base model, the shareholders’ utility is perfectly linked to firm value and is
maximized when y = (a˜, p˜). In Section 4.1, I analyze an extended model in which the
shareholders’ utility is also dependent on a cost not directly related to firm value.
The following utility function characterizes the preferences of the good and the bad
CEOs.
Ui = −[(yp − p˜+ g)2 + (ya − a˜+ g)2] + χb, i = G,B. (3)
where the magnitude of the management bias, g > 0, measures the extent of an agency
problem between the CEO and the board.11 Because of this parameter g, the CEO’s
utility is maximized by choosing a decision, y = (a˜− g, p˜− g) and the CEO’s decisions
on ya and yp will be biased. χ is an indicator function taking a value of one if the CEO
retains control over the project, and zero if the board opposes the CEO’s decision. The
parameter b > 0 measures the CEO’s private benefit of retaining control over the project.
11We can also let both of the CEO and board have the bias, say gC > 0 and gB > 0, respectively.
Then, assuming that the CEO has a larger bias than does the board (i.e., gC ≥ gB), the effects of g on
our conclusions will be weakens. For example, the monitoring intensity will be smaller in Section 3.2
because g2 will be replaced by (gC − gB)2.
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The CEO may benefit from maintaining a decision so that he can possibly build a good
reputation, which may help him obtain another position in the future. Both the good
CEO and the bad CEO have the same utility function, but their decisions can differ.
Finally, the board’s utility function is given by:
Ui = −[(yp − p˜)2 + (ya − a˜)2]− C(pi; Ii) + (1− χ)d, i = H,L. (4)
where the parameter d > 0 measures the board’s private benefit from taking control
of the project. If the board successfully monitors the CEO, some board members may
be able to establish a reputation and obtain another board position in the future. I
assume, however, that the board’s private benefit is smaller than or equal to the CEO’s
private benefit (i.e., b ≥ d), which I believe is a realistic assumption. C(pi; Ii) = pi22Ii
is the cost of monitoring the CEO with intensity pi. The parameters IH , IL ∈ (0, 1]
determine the cost of monitoring for the informed and uninformed boards, respectively.
The monitoring intensity cost increases as the intensity pi increases and the parameter I
decreases. Adams and Ferreira (2007) also employ a quadratic monitoring cost function.
In their model, the monitoring cost parameter I is an endogenous variable, but I is an
exogenous variable in my model. I assume that outsiders have a lower monitoring cost
than insiders by setting IH ≥ IL. This is because outsiders are less dependent on the
CEO, and thus generally less reluctant to oppose the CEO’s decision than are insiders
whose careers closely align with the CEO’s power. For a technical reason, I assume that
2g2 + d > σ2p. With this assumption, as shown in Section 3.2, the board’s monitoring
intensity is always positive and there will be an interaction between the advising and
monitoring at t = 2.12
3 Analysis of the Model
3.1 Advising
This section solves the game by working backwards. At t = 2, the project decision
depends on who makes it. When the board controls the project decision, the informed
board chooses yH = (yHa , y
H
p ) after observing both the observation a of a˜ and the obser-
vation p of p˜ if θ is revealed and nothing if θ is not revealed. Similarly, the uninformed
board that observes only p if it knows θ and observes no information otherwise chooses





(a, p), if the informed board knows θ




(E(a˜), p), if the uninformed board knows θ
(E(a˜), E(p˜)), if the uninformed board does not know θ.
(6)
12When the board’s message is informative (i.e., N(g, ·) 6= 1), we have 2g2 ≥ 3A2
24
. Because σ2p ≤ 2A224 ,
we can have 2g2 > σ2p, and the assumption still holds even if d = 0. However, if 2g
2 ≤ σ2p, we need some
positive private benefit for the board (d > 0) to satisfy this assumption.
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Thus, the first-best outcome is achieved when the informed board is selected and it
makes the project decision.
When the CEO decides on the project, the good CEO who knows the observation p
and the bad CEO who knows nothing, set yG and yB, respectively. They can improve
this decision by receiving advice, or a signal s and s ′, from the board.
yG =
{
(E(a˜|s)− g, p− g), if the good CEO receives a signal about a˜
(E(a˜)− g, p− g), if the good CEO receives no signal. (7)
yB =

(E(a˜|s)− g, E(p˜|s ′)− g), if the bad CEO receives a signal about a˜, p˜
(E(a˜)− g, E(p˜|s ′)− g), if the bad CEO receives a signal about p˜
(E(a˜)− g, E(p˜)− g), if the bad CEO receives no signal.
(8)
where E(a˜|s) (E(p˜|s ′)) is the mean of the CEO’s posterior beliefs after receiving a signal
s about a˜ (s ′ about p˜) from the board.
At this stage, if the board remains uninformed about θ, it cannot provide any advice
to the CEO. However, if the CEO reveals θ, the board can obtain private information a˜
and/or p˜ and send a message to the CEO about the project. A communication game be-
tween the board and the CEO then determines the quality of the board’s advice. Accord-
ing to Harris and Raviv (2010, 2008, 2005), when the board sends the message s about
a˜, the board will partition the support of a˜ into intervals [a0, a1], [a1, a2], ..., [aN−1, aN ],
with 0 = a0 < a1 < ... < aN = A, where the number of intervals in the Pareto-best
equilibrium13 of the game N = N(g,A) is determined by management bias, g, and the










− 2gi(N(g,A)− i), i = 0, ..., N(g,A). (10)
where 〈x〉 is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. N(g,A) is a nondecreasing
(nonincreasing) function of A (g) and approaches one as A (g) decreases (increases).
The partition of the support of p˜ is determined in the same way. Then the board sends
a message that is randomly drawn from the partition containing a˜ (or p˜). If the board
sends a noisy message s ∈ [ai−1, ai] (s ′ ∈ [pi−1, pi]), the CEO’s expectation about a˜
(p˜) given s becomes E(a˜|s) = ai−1+ai2 (E(p˜|s ′) = pi−1+pi2 ). The board’s advice is more
accurate when N = N(g, ·) increases. When N(g, ·) = 1, the board’s message becomes
completely uninformative.
The residual variances of a˜ and p˜ after the CEO receives a signal s or s ′ from the
board are denoted by σ2 and σ
2
η. Given ai − ai−1 = A/N + 2g(2i−N − 1), the residual
variance σ2 becomes:




























The residual variance σ2η is determined in the same way. The board’s advice reduces the
uncertainty about these random variables. That is, σ2 ≤ σ2a = A2/12, and σ2η ≤ σ2p =
P 2/12. The equality holds when the board message does not contain any information
(i.e., N(g, ·) = 1).
3.2 Monitoring Intensity
Next, I analyze the board’s monitoring intensity decision at t = 2. The board’s decision
on the monitoring intensity depends on how the game proceeds. The monitoring intensity
is a function of the parameter Ii, (i = H,L) and differs over four scenarios for each of
the informed and uninformed boards. Let i = {H,L} and j = {θ, ∅} denote the board’s
type and its information about θ. I calculate the monitoring intensity for each of the
following scenarios: (i) the good CEO reveals his project choice, piiG(j = θ; Ii), (ii) the
good CEO does not reveal his project choice, piiG(j = ∅; Ii), (iii) the bad CEO reveals his
project choice, piiB(j = θ; Ii), and (iv) the bad CEO does not reveal his project choice,
piiB(j = ∅; Ii).
For the informed board, the monitoring intensity in scenario (i) solves:14
max
pi∈[0,1]
piE[−{(yHa − a˜)2 + (yHp − p˜)2}+ d|j = θ]









Then the optimal level of monitoring intensity is given by:
piHG(j = θ; IH) = IH(σ
2
 + 2g
2 + d). (13)
In scenario (ii), the informed board does not know the information about the project
choice and solves:
14Because E(a˜|s) = ai+1+ai
2





− a˜− g)2|a˜ ∈ [ai−1, ai])
]





piE[−{(yHa − a˜)2 + (yHp − p˜)2}+ d|j = ∅]









The optimal level of monitoring intensity is given by:
piHG(j = ∅; IH) = IH(2g2 + d− σ2p). (15)
In scenarios (iii) and (iv), the optimal level of monitoring intensity becomes:





2 + d), (16)
piHB(j = ∅; IH) = IH(2g2 + d). (17)
Similarly, for the uninformed board, the monitoring intensity in each of scenarios (i),
(ii), (iii), and (iv) is given by:
piLG(j = θ; IL) = IL(2g
2 + d), (18)
piLG(j = ∅; IL) = IL(2g2 + d− σ2p), (19)
piLB(j = θ; IL) = IL(σ
2
η + 2g
2 + d), (20)
piLB(j = ∅; IL) = IL(2g2 + d). (21)
Given the assumption 2g2+d > σ2p, all of the above monitoring intensities pi take posi-
tive values. The following results are obtained by comparing these monitoring intensities.
Proposition 1. The monitoring intensity pi has the following properties.
(a) For given i = {H,L}, j = {θ, ∅}, and k = {G,B}, ∂∂Iipiik(j; Ii) > 0.
(b) For given i = {H,L}, j = {θ, ∅}, and k = {G,B}, ∂∂gpiik(j; Ii) > 0.
(c) For given i = {H,L}, j = {θ, ∅}, and k = {G,B}, ∂∂dpiik(j; Ii) > 0.
(d) For given i = {H,L}, and k = {G,B}, piik(j = θ; Ii) > piik(j = ∅; Ii).
(e) For given i = {H,L}, and j = {θ, ∅}, piiB(j; Ii) > piiG(j; Ii).
(f) For a given k = {G,B}, piHk(j = θ; IH) > piLk(j = θ; IL), and piHk(j = ∅; IH) ≥
piLk(j = ∅; IL).
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Result (a) states that a smaller monitoring cost leads to a larger monitoring intensity.
Results (b) and (c) show that the board has an incentive to remove the management
bias and to satisfy its private benefit by monitoring the CEO.15 Result (d) is that, as
shown in Adams and Ferreira (2007), the monitoring intensity increases when the CEO
reveals the project choice to the board and the board observes private information.
Moreover, result (e) states that the board is tougher on the bad CEO. That is, both the
informed and uninformed boards monitor the bad CEO more intensively than they do
the good CEO. Finally, the informed board is a tough monitor. As shown in result (f),
the informed board has a stronger incentive to monitor than the uninformed board. If
IH = IL and θ is not revealed, however, the informed and uninformed boards have the
same level of monitoring intensity.
3.3 Decision to Reveal Information
At t = 1, the CEO decides whether to reveal his project choice to the board. The CEO
communicates with the board if the expected utility of revealing θ is greater than or
equal to that of not revealing it. In the case of the informed board, the good CEO’s
expected utility when he reveals θ, EUHG(j = θ; IH), and when he does not reveal it,
EUHG(j = ∅; IH), are:
EUHG(j = θ; IH) = piHG(j = θ; IH)E[−((yHa − a˜+ g)2 + (yHp − p˜+ g)2)|j = θ]
+ (1− piHG(j = θ; IH)){E[−((yGa − a˜+ g)2 + (yGp − p˜+ g)2)|j = θ] + b}
= −(σ2 − b) + piHG(j = θ; IH)(σ2 − 2g2 − b), (22)
and
EUHG(j = ∅; IH) = piHG(j = ∅; IH)E[−((yHa − a˜+ g)2 + (yHp − p˜+ g)2)|j = ∅]
+ (1− piHG(j = ∅; IH)){E[−((yGa − a˜+ g)2 + (yGp − p˜+ g)2|j = ∅] + b}
= −(σ2a − b) + piHG(j = ∅; IH)(−σ2p − 2g2 − b). (23)
The good CEO reveals θ if EUHG(j = θ; IH) ≥ EUHG(j = ∅; IH) and does not reveal it
otherwise. That is, the good CEO reveals θ to the informed board only if:
EUHG(j = θ; IH)−EUHG(j = ∅; IH) = (σ2a−σ2 )+IH(σ2+σ2p)(σ2−σ2p−b+d) ≥ 0. (24)
The bad CEO’s expected utility of revealing θ, EUHB(j = θ; IH), and that of not
revealing it, EUHB(j = ∅; IH), are:
15The increase in g affects the monitoring intensity, both directly and indirectly, because it also




EUHB(j = θ; IH) = −(σ2 + σ2η − b) + piHB(j = θ; IH)(σ2 + σ2η − 2g2 − b), (25)
EUHB(j = ∅; IH) = −(σ2a + σ2p − b) + piHB(j = ∅; IH)(−2g2 − b). (26)
Thus, the bad CEO reveals θ to the informed board if:









η − b+ d)
≥ 0, (27)
and does not reveal it otherwise.
When the board is uninformed, the CEO’s expected utility in each scenario is given
by:
EULG(j = θ; IL) = −(σ2a − b) + piLG(j = θ; IL)(−2g2 − b) (28)
EULG(j = ∅; IL) = −(σ2a − b) + piLG(j = ∅; IL)(−σ2p − 2g2 − b) (29)
EULB(j = θ; IL) = −(σ2a + σ2η − b) + piLB(j = θ; IL)(σ2η − 2g2 − b) (30)
EULB(j = ∅; IL) = −(σ2a + σ2p − b) + piLB(j = ∅; IL)(−2g2 − b) (31)
In the case of the uninformed board, the good CEO always chooses not to communicate
with the board because EULG(j = θ; IL) − EULG(j = ∅; IL) < 0 always holds. On the
other hand, the bad CEO communicates with the board if EULB(j = θ; IL)−EULB(j =
∅; IL) = (σ2p − σ2η) + ILσ2η(σ2η − b+ d) ≥ 0 and does not communicate otherwise.
The equilibrium of the game at t = 1 depends on the monitoring cost parameter
Ii, (i = H,L). I define the cutoff parameters I










p + b− σ2 − d > 0







η)(b−σ2−σ2η−d) if b− σ
2
 − σ2η − d > 0





σ2η(b−σ2η−d) if b− σ
2
η − d > 0
1, if b− σ2η − d ≤ 0.
(34)
Proposition 2. In the case of the informed board, the equilibrium is one of the following
states (E1), (E2), or (E3):
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(E1) If IH ≤ I∗, both the good CEO and the bad CEO reveal θ to the informed board.
(E2) If I∗ < IH ≤ I∗∗, the good CEO does not reveal θ and the bad CEO reveals θ to
the informed board.
(E3) If I∗∗ < IH , both the good CEO and the bad CEO do not reveal θ to the informed
board.
The proof is in the Appendix. The above results indicate that when the monitoring
intensity cost is sufficiently large, both the good CEO and the bad CEO are willing to
communicate the project choice with the informed board and obtain advice in return.
This is because, in this case, the CEO knows that the board has little incentive to turn
down the CEO’s decision. However, when the cost of monitoring intensity is not large
enough, the good CEO becomes cautious about sharing information with the board,
even when the bad CEO shares it. That is, the good CEO places greater value on re-
taining control of the project than on obtaining advice from the board because he has
his own private information. The bad CEO, however, has a stronger incentive to receive
advice from the board than does the good CEO because he does not have any private
information. When the board can easily reverse the CEO’s decision because of a small
monitoring intensity cost, both the good and bad CEOs avoid communicating with the
informed board.
Proposition 3. In the case of the uninformed board, the good CEO never reveals θ to
the board. The equilibrium is one of states (E4) or (E5):
(E4) If IL ≤ I∗∗∗, the good CEO does not reveal θ to the uninformed board and the
bad CEO reveals θ.
(E5) If I∗∗∗ < IL, both the good CEO and the bad CEO do not reveal θ to the unin-
formed board.
Because the uninformed board can generate only inside information the good CEO
already has, the good CEO has no informational advantage from communicating with
the uninformed board. However, the bad CEO who does not observe any private infor-
mation is willing to communicate with the uninformed board when the cost of monitoring
intensity is sufficiently large so that the board has little incentive to turn down the CEO’s
decision. When the monitoring cost is smaller than the cutoff level, even the bad CEO
avoids communicating with the board.
Figure 2 shows the effects of the changes in b, g, and d on I∗, I∗∗, and I∗∗∗, respec-
tively. In the left-side panels, the straight line and the dotted line represent I∗ and I∗∗,
respectively, and in the right-side panels, the straight line represents I∗∗∗. The parame-
ter values used in these figures are d = 0.1, b = 5.0, g = 0.05, and σ2a and σ
2












Fig. 2.1. CEO’s private benefit b.
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Fig. 2.2. Management bias g.
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Fig. 2.3. Board’s private benefit d.
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Figure 2. Comparative statics of cutoff parameters I. Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3
show the effects of the changes in b, g, and d on I∗, I∗∗, and I∗∗∗, respectively. In the left-side
panels, the straight line represents I∗ and the dotted line represents I∗∗. In the right-side panels,
the straight line represents I∗∗∗. The parameter values are set at d = 0.1, b = 5.0, g = 0.05,
and σ2a = σ
2
p = 1/12 (A = P = 1.0), and the cutoff parameters are plotted for 0.2 ≤ b ≤ 10,
0 ≤ g ≤ 0.25, and 0.1 ≤ d ≤ 1.0.
1/12 (A = P = 1.0). States (E3), (E2), and (E1) occur when IH is above I
∗∗, between
I∗ and I∗∗, and below or equal to I∗, while states (E5) and (E4) occur when IL is above
I∗∗ and below or equal to I∗, respectively. In each figure, the parameter restrictions are
satisfied.
As shown in Fig. 2.1, if N(g, ·) > 1, each of the cutoff parameters is a decreasing
function of b with a decreasing slope. Consequently, the CEO is unwilling to commu-
nicate with the board when holding a larger private benefit from retaining control over
the project. In particular, the good CEO is very sensitive to the change in b and avoids
communicating with the board, even with a small b. As a result, the likelihood of states
(E1), (E2), and (E4) decreases, while that of states (E3) and (E5) increases with b. In












Fig. 3.1. Outside information σ2a.
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Fig. 3.2. Inside information σ2p.
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Figure 3. Comparative statics of cutoff parameters II. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show
the effects of the changes in σ2a and σ
2
p on I
∗, I∗∗, and I∗∗∗, respectively. In the left-side panels,
the straight line represents I∗ and the dotted line represents I∗∗. In the right-side panels, the
straight line represents I∗∗∗. The parameter values are set at d = 0.1, b = 5.0, and g = 0.05. In
Fig. 3.1, σ2p = 1/48 (P = 0.5) and 0 ≤ σ2a ≤ 1/12 (0 ≤ A ≤ 1.0), and in Fig. 3.2, σ2a = 1/48
(A = 0.5) and 0 ≤ σ2p ≤ 1/12 (0 ≤ P ≤ 1.0).
increases. When g takes a smaller value, the CEO has a stronger incentive to consult
with the board because the board’s message becomes more accurate. In particular, the
bad CEO, who does not have any private information, is eager to consult with the board
in this situation. Conversely, the CEO has less incentive to communicate with the board
when g becomes larger. This is because when the agency problem is severe, the board’s
message becomes less precise. Therefore, the likelihood of states (E2) and (E4) is high
when g takes a small value, while that of states (E3) and (E5) increases with g. All the
cutoff parameters becomes zero when N(g, ·) = 1, as the board’s signal does not convey






η). As shown in Fig. 2.3, if N(g, ·) > 1, the
effect of an increase in d on each cutoff parameter is positive. The CEO, especially the
bad CEO, has greater incentive to reveal θ to the board as the likelihood of states (E2)
and (E4) increases with d. When the board has a larger private benefit, the decision
maker is more likely to be the board itself. Thus, the CEO chooses to reveal θ to allow
the board to observe private information.
Figure 3 depicts the effects of the changes in σ2a and σ
2
p on I
∗, I∗∗, and I∗∗∗, re-
spectively. The parameter values are set at d = 0.1, b = 5.0, and g = 0.05. In Fig.
3.1, σ2p = 1/48 and 0 ≤ σ2a ≤ 1/12, and in Fig. 3.2, σ2a = 1/48 and 0 ≤ σ2p ≤ 1/12,
respectively. The effects of the changes in σ2a and σ
2
p on the cutoff parameters are totally
different. As shown in Fig. 3.1, both I∗ and I∗∗ generally increase as σ2a becomes larger,
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although these functions exhibit some discontinuities when the board changes its advis-
ing strategy. In the case of the informed board, both the good and the bad CEO have
a stronger incentive to communicate with the board when outside information becomes
more valuable. Thus, state (E1) is more likely to occur, whereas the likelihood of state
(E3) becomes less when σ2a increases. As is obvious from the equation, σ
2
a has no impact
on I∗∗∗. In contrast, Fig. 3.2 shows that the change in σ2p exerts an asymmetric effect on
the behaviors of the good and bad CEOs. When the firm’s inside information becomes
valuable, the good CEO already knows it has less incentive to communicate with the
informed board, but the bad CEO, who does not know this, has a stronger incentive
to seek advice from either the informed or uninformed board. As a result, in the case
of the informed board, state (E2) is more likely to occur while the likelihood of states
(E1) and (E3) decreases as σ2a becomes large. In the case of the uninformed board,
the likelihood of state (E4) becomes higher, while that of state (E5) becomes lower as
outside information becomes more important.
3.4 Optimal Board
Lastly, I consider the optimal choice of board structure. At t = 0, the shareholders
select either the informed board or the uninformed board by comparing the expected
utility attached to each choice. If the informed board is selected, one of states (E1),
(E2), or (E3) occurs depending upon the value of IH , and the shareholders receive
the corresponding expected utility, E(US(k)), k = {E1, E2, E3}. For instance, the
shareholders’ utility when state (E1) occurs is given by:
E(US(E1)) = q[piHG(θ)E(−((yHa − a˜)2 + (yHp − p˜)2)|j = θ)
+ (1− piHG(θ))E(−((yGa − a˜)2 + (yGp − p˜)2)|j = θ)]
+ (1− q)[piHB(θ)E(−((yHa − a˜)2 + (yHp − p˜)2)|j = θ)
+ (1− piHB(θ))E(−((yBa − a˜)2 + (yBp − p˜)2)|j = θ)]. (35)
Similarly, when the uninformed board is selected, either state (E4) or (E5) occurs
depending on the value of IL, and the shareholders receive the corresponding expected
utility, E(US(l)), l = {E4, E5}. As there are three possible states if the informed board
is selected and there are two possible states if the uninformed board is selected, it is
sufficient to consider the six possible combinations of the equilibrium states: (E1, E4),
(E2, E4), (E3, E4), (E1, E5), (E2, E5), and (E3, E5). The shareholders choose the in-
formed board if E(US(k)) − E(US(l)) ≥ 0, k = {E1, E2, E3}, l = {E4, E5} and the
uninformed board if E(US(k))− E(US(l)) < 0.
Proposition 4. Shareholders’ optimal choice of a board is such that:
(a) In states (E1, E4) and (E1, E5), the shareholders always choose the informed
board.
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0 such that the informed board is chosen if d ≤ d∗(·,·), and the uninformed board is
chosen if d > d∗(·,·).
(c) In state (E3, E4), the uninformed board is chosen if q(IH − IL)(2g2 − σ2p)(2g2 −
σ2p + d)+ (1− q)[(σ2η −σ2p)+ IH2g2(2g2+ d)− IL(σ2η + d+2g2)(σ2η +2g2)] < 0, and
the informed board is chosen otherwise. In particular, if IH = IL, the shareholders
always choose the uninformed board.
The above proposition confirms that the optimal board is generally the informed
board except for state (E3, E4). Result (a) shows that in states (E1, E4) and (E1, E5),
the shareholders can achieve the first-best outcome by choosing the informed board if
the board successfully rejects the CEO’s decision. In this state, both the good and the
bad CEOs are willing to reveal θ to the informed board, as the board’s monitoring cost
is sufficiently high. So the informed board can be a perfect decision maker that can
set yH = (a, p) and eliminate the agency cost g by monitoring the CEO. Even if the
informed board fails to monitor the CEO, it can assist the CEO in making a better
decision by sending a message about a˜ and p˜. As shown in result (b), it is also optimal
for the shareholders to choose the informed board in states (E2, E4), (E2, E5), and
(E3, E5) if the board’s private benefit d is relatively small. However, if the board has
a sufficiently large d, the shareholders optimally choose the uninformed board. In this
situation, the informed board is a better choice if the bad CEO is hired. However, if
the good CEO is hired, and does not reveal θ, then the informed board may make a
poorer decision than does the good CEO. This is because the informed board, which
wishes to satisfy its private benefit, overturn the CEO’s decision excessively, even if it
fails to observe any private information, and can therefore harm firm value. Therefore,
the uninformed board, which has less incentive to monitor the CEO, can represent a
better choice.
More interestingly, result (c) implies that the shareholders always choose the unin-
formed board in state (E3, E4) if the informed and uninformed boards face the same
monitoring intensity cost (i.e., IH = IL). Actually, in this case, the good CEO is indiffer-
ent to the choice of board, and only the bad CEO changes his behavior depending on the
board type. Even if the monitoring intensity cost differs for the two boards, the left-hand
side of the equation in result (c) generally becomes negative unless we assume extreme
parameter values, and thus it is optimal for the shareholders to choose the uninformed
board. In this state, choosing the uninformed board has two advantages. The first is,
as in the other states, that the shareholders can avoid the informed board’s incorrect
decision when d is large. The second advantage, which has a more pronounced effect
than the first, is that the shareholders can encourage the bad CEO to reveal θ to the
board, which results in a better corporate decision. This is because, in state (E3, E4),
both the good and the bad CEOs avoid communicating with the informed board for fear
of losing control over the decision. However, the bad CEO still has an incentive to share













Figure 4. Comparative statics in (E3, E4). The figure shows the effects of the change
in q and σ2p on the left-hand side of the equation in (c) of Proposition 4. The parameters are set
at d = 0.1, IH = 0.9, IL = 0.2, g = 0.05, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.0, and 0.01 ≤ σ2p ≤ 1/12.
the uninformed board in order to induce the bad CEO to reveal his project choice.
Figure 4 illustrates how the probability of hiring the bad CEO, 1 − q, and the im-
portance of inside information, σ2p, affect the left-hand side of the equation in result (c).
The parameters are set at d = 0.1, IH = 0.9, IL = 0.2, and g = 0.05.
16 As shown, the
value of this equation becomes smaller as 1− q approaches one and σ2p approaches 1/12
(i.e., P → 1.0). That is, the shareholders have more incentive to appoint the uninformed
board when the probability of hiring the bad CEO is higher and the firm’s inside infor-
mation held by the uninformed board becomes more valuable. This is because, in this
situation, the shareholders can greatly improve firm value by inducing the bad CEO to
communicate with the board.
4 Extensions
The basic model reveals that the shareholders select the informed board unless the board
has a strong incentive to monitor the CEO. A question is whether it is always optimal
for the shareholders to choose the informed board when the board has a large monitoring
intensity cost. In this section, I extend the basic model and consider two situations in
which the shareholders may choose the uninformed board, even if the informed board’s
monitoring intensity cost is relatively large. More specifically, these extended models
consider how the shareholders’ cost associated with a disagreement between the board
and the CEO and the magnitude of firm diversification affect the shareholders’ choice of
board.
16The equation is not continuous because the board changes its advising strategy as σ2pchanges.
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4.1 Shareholders’ Cost
In this subsection, I analyze an extended model in which the shareholders incur some
physical or psychological costs not directly related to firm value when the board rejects
the CEO’s decision. Specifically, I add a parameter c > 0 that measures the cost of the
shareholders to their utility function as:
US = −[(yp − p˜)2 + (ya − a˜)2]− (1− χ)c. (36)
As χ is an indicator function taking a value of one if the CEO retains control over the
project and zero otherwise, the shareholders incur a positive cost c only when the board
stands against the CEO’s decision.
This change does not alter the board’s decisions on advising and monitoring intensity
nor the CEO’s decision to reveal θ. Thus, the results in Propositions 1, 2, and 3 do not
change. In addition, the uninformed board is preferable, even with a small c in state
(E3, E4), and also in states (E2, E4), (E2, E5), and (E3, E5) if the board’s private
benefit d is sufficiently large, as shown in the results of (b) and (c) of Proposition 4. The
following proposition, however, shows that the uninformed board can be optimal even
in states (E1, E4) and (E1, E5) if the shareholders’ cost c is sufficiently large.
Proposition 5. Assume that the shareholders incur cost c > 0 when the board conflicts
with the CEO. Then, in states (E1, E4) and (E1, E5), there are c∗(E1,E4), c
∗
(E1,E5) ≥ 0
such that the informed board is chosen if c ≤ c∗(·,·), and the uninformed board is chosen
if c > c∗(·,·).
This proposition confirms that the optimal board is generally the informed board
unless the shareholders incur a large cost in rejecting the CEO’s decision. It is usually
best for the shareholders to elect outsiders who can bring outside information to the firm
during the decision-making process rather than selecting uninformed insiders. However,
the shareholders choose the uninformed board if they have a large c and do not wish to
see conflict between the CEO and the board. The shareholders know that the informed
board is more likely to reject the CEO’s decision and thus prefer the uninformed board
if c is large enough to offset the benefit of using outside information.
4.2 Firm Diversification
Next, I examine the effects of firm diversification on the board choice. Throughout this
subsection, I assume that an insider in a diversified firm with a larger number of business
units has a smaller piece of inside information relative to the firm’s entire business. Let
N ∈ N be the magnitude of firm diversification possibly measured by the number of
business units in the firm. The larger the value of N , the more diversified the firm.
Additionally, letM,L ∈ N such thatM ≥ N,L denotes the board size, and the necessary
number of outside board members the firm needs to acquire outside information a˜, and
let r ∈ [0, 1] determine the fraction of inside information p˜ the informed board can
observe.
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I then assume that the probability of hiring a good CEO is a nonincreasing function of
N , which satisfies q(1) = 1 and limN→∞ q(N) = 0. If a firm is involved in many unrelated
businesses, each employee can observe only a limited piece of inside information, and it
then becomes difficult for the board to hire a good CEO with sufficient inside information
about the project. Because of M ≥ N , the board size is large enough to collect all the
pieces of inside information by appointing a director from each business unit if the firm
does not have any outside directors. Thus, if the uninformed board is chosen, the board
can perfectly observe p˜. On the other hand, if the informed board is chosen, the amount
of inside information observed by the board is a nondecreasing function of α ≡ M−LN ,
which satisfies r(α) = 1 if α ≥ 1, and limα→0 r(α) = 0. Intuitively, M −L represents the
number of insiders on the board, and if M − L is large enough to cover all the business
units N , the informed board can observe not only a˜ but also p˜. However, if α < 1,
the informed board can observe a˜ and only a fraction of p˜, and the amount of p˜ the
informed board can observe decreases as α becomes smaller. This situation arises when
a diversified firm with a large value of N has a relatively small board or when it needs
to appoint many outsiders on the board to obtain useful outside information.
More specifically, for the informed board, I divide the inside information p˜ into r(α)p˜1
and (1−r(α))p˜2, where p˜1 and p˜2 are independent (also independent of a˜) and follow the
same uniform distribution as p˜. The management bias associated with rp˜1 and (1− r)p˜2
is assumed to be rg and (1−r)g, respectively. At the advising stage, the informed board
observes not only a˜ but also rp˜1, but cannot observe (1− r)p˜2, even if θ is revealed. As
a result, its decision becomes:
yH =
{
(a, rp1 + (1− r)E(p˜2)), if the informed board knows θ
(E(a˜), E(p˜)), if the informed board does not know θ.
(37)
The decisions of the uninformed board and the good CEO are the same as in our basic
model. The decision of the bad CEO, however, changes to yB = (E(a˜|s)−g, rE(p˜1|s ′)+
(1−r)E(p˜2)−g) only when he receives advice from the informed board, but his decision
does not change in the remaining situations.
With these changes, the optimal level of monitoring intensity changes only for piHG(j =
θ) and piHB(j = θ) as follows:
piHG(j = θ; IH) = IH(σ
2
 + 2g
2 + d− (1− r)2σ2p), (38)




2 + d). (39)
When r = 1, the monitoring intensity is the same as in the basic model. However, as
r ↓ 0, or α ↓ 0, the monitoring intensity lessens because the informed board can observe
only a fraction of p˜ and has less of an information advantage.
These changes also affect the CEO’s decision about whether to communicate with
the informed board. Propositions 2 and 3 continue to hold, but the cutoff parameters I∗







2σ2p)((2−r2)σ2p+b−σ2−d) if (2− r
2)σ2p + b− σ2 − d > 0






2σ2η)(b−σ2−r2σ2η−d) if b− σ
2
 − r2σ2η − d > 0
1, if b− σ2 − r2σ2η − d ≤ 0,
(41)
(42)
In the case of the informed board, as r approaches one, the likelihood of (E3) increases,
and the bad CEO has more incentive to communicate with the board to obtain inside
information.
The following proposition states that even if the informed board has little incentive
to act against the CEO’s decision, the shareholders of a diversified firm may prefer to
choose the uninformed board instead of the informed board.
Proposition 6. In this extended model, if r(α) = 1, the shareholders always choose the
informed board in state (E1, E4) and also in state (E2, E4) if d ≤ d∗(E2,E4). However,
if r(α) < 1, the shareholders may choose the uninformed board even with a small d. In






2)− ILσ2η(σ2η + 2g2) + (IH − IL)(2g2 + d)(2g2 + σ2 + σ2η) < 0 and the
informed board is chosen otherwise.
In Proposition 6, the condition for selecting the uninformed board if r(α) = 0 and
q(N) = 0 (i.e., α ↓ 0 and N ↑ ∞) can be simplified further by assuming that both
types of board have the same monitoring intensity cost (i.e., IH = IL) and that both of
the residual variances are negligible (i.e., σ2 = σ
2
η ≈ 0). Then the uninformed board is
preferred when, for the bad CEO, the benefit of receiving advice on inside information
is larger than that of receiving advice on outside information (i.e., σ2p − σ2η > σ2a − σ2 ).
Firm diversification then affects board choice via two channels. The first is that as
the magnitude of firm diversification rises, any potential CEO has only a small piece
of inside information. Thus, the board can play an important role in collecting enough
inside information by appointing some insiders from each business unit to the board.
The second channel is that if the diversified firm has too many outside directors relative
to board size, it may fail to collect enough inside information. Therefore, if inside
information is more valuable than outside information, the shareholders may prefer to
choose the uninformed board that cannot produce any outside information, but can
collect inside information and use it during the firm’s decision-making process.
In states (E1, E5) and (E2, E5), the shareholders always choose the informed board
if r(α) = 1 and d ≤ d∗(E2,E5), and still choose the informed board even if q(N) = r(α) = 0.
In states (E3, E4) and (E3, E5), q(N) affects board choice but r(α) does not. In state
(E3, E4), as mentioned in the previous section, the shareholders have a greater incentive
to choose the uninformed board as 1− q(N) becomes larger. Therefore, if the firm has
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many unrelated businesses, it would be beneficial for the shareholders to encourage the
bad CEO to communicate with the uninformed board in this state. In state (E3, E5),
the magnitude of firm diversification affects the cutoff value d∗(E3,E5).
5 Board Structure in Japan
As discussed in the introduction, the board structure of Japanese firms has several
distinct features. First, Japanese firms continue to prefer the Kansayaku system, even
though it has a more limited ability to monitor management than the committees system,
which has significantly strengthened the monitoring role of boards. Second, Japanese
firms have been rapidly increasing the number of outside directors on their boards in
recent years, even though most do not apply the committees system. Lastly, there
remains significant variability in attitudes toward the hiring of outside directors across
firms.
I can at least partially explain these features using my model. Regarding the first
point, we can consider the committees system as an informed board with a majority
of outsiders who have an enhanced monitoring power (i.e., small monitoring intensity
cost), whereas the traditional Kansayaku system is relatively uninformed because it
generally has many insiders with little incentive to monitor management (i.e., large
monitoring intensity cost). Therefore, as in state (E3, E4), shareholders may want to
choose the Kansayaku system to encourage communication between management and
the board members. The second point concerns the choice between the informed board
with many outsiders and the uninformed board with few outsiders, both of which employ
the Kansayaku system with its large monitoring intensity cost. Thus, Kansayaku firms
are willing to hire additional outside directors because they can take advantage of outside
information without worrying about miscommunication between management and the
board. Nevertheless, some Japanese firms choose the committees system. The basic
model implies that various firm-specific factors, including the CEO’s and board’s private
benefit, management bias, and/or the importance of inside and outside information, also
affect the firm’s choice of board.
Regarding the third point, the extended models imply that firms choose the unin-
formed board that is friendlier to the CEO if the shareholders incur some costs when
the board turns down the CEO’s decision. In addition, a diversified firm may face some
difficulty in finding a good CEO who can fully observe inside information. It can then
be optimal for such a firm to choose the uninformed board with only a small number of
outsiders, given it has many insiders who can collect sufficient inside information from
each business unit. In the analysis below, I examine the relationship between foreign
shareholders and board structure. Foreign shareholders have a smaller shareholders’
cost if they are less reluctant than are Japanese shareholders to see the conflict between
the board and management. In addition, I examine how the board structure differs
across industries because firms involved in many businesses may have a smaller number
of outside directors than those specializing in relatively few businesses.
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Figure 5. Foreign Shareholders and Board Structure The figure shows the rela-
tionship between the percentage of foreign shareholders and the board structures of TSE-listed
firms. There are 3,491 sample firms, of which 344 have 30% or more foreign shareholders, 378
have from less than 30% to 20%, 628 have from less than 20% to 10%, and 2,141 have less than
10%. For each of these subsamples, the black, gray, and light gray bars represent the percentage
(%) of firms with the committees system, Kansayaku firms with outside directors representing
30% or more of the board, and Kansayaku firms with outside directors representing 15% or less
of the board, respectively. The grid lines indicate the percentages for all sample firms. The
sample firms are from the corporate governance information search on May 7, 2016 and the list
of TSE-listed issues on March 31, 2016, both of which are publicly available on the TSE website.
board structure. The sample is collected from the corporate governance information
search on May 7, 2016 and the list of TSE-listed issues as of March 31, 2016 on the
TSE’s website.17 There are 3,491 firms in total, for which the average board size is 8.00
(7.97 for Kansayaku firms and 9.10 for committee firms) and the average number of
outside directors is 1.77 (1.70 for Kansayaku firms and 5.05 for committee firms). I sort
the sample into subsamples according to the share of foreign shareholders. For the 3,491
sample firms, 344 have 30% or more foreign shareholders, 378 have between less than
30% to 20%, 628 have less than 20% to 10%, and 2,141 have less than 10%. For each
subsample, the black, gray, and light gray bars represent the percentage of firms with
the committees system, Kansayaku firms with outsiders representing 30% or more of the
board, and Kansayaku firms with outsiders representing 15% or less of board members,
respectively. Across all of the sample firms, 29.53% are Kansayaku firms with at most
15% outsiders and 21.51% are Kansayaku firms with at least 30% outsiders. Committee
firms account for a mere 1.98% of firms in the full sample.
As shown, among Kansayaku firms there is a clear positive correlation between for-
eign ownership and the number of outside directors. While 34.30% of the firms with
30% or more foreigner shareholders have at least 30% board outsiders, only 14.53% have
at most 15% board outsiders. Conversely, 20.04% of firms with less than 10% foreign
shareholders have at least 30% board outsiders, but 32.09% have at most 15% outsiders.
17In Figures 5 and 6, the definition of Kansayaku firms includes both Kansayaku firms (3,093 firms)
and firms with a Kansa committee (329 firms). The Kansa committee firms generally have many outside
directors. Importantly, my interpretations remain valid even after excluding these firms from the sample.
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That is, the firms with many foreign shareholders who are likely to have small share-
holders’ costs associated with disagreement between the CEO and management tend to
appoint many outside directors who can bring with them outside information, but also
might harshly intervene in management’s decisions. In contrast, Japanese shareholders
with large shareholders’ costs prefer to have inside directors. Similarly, firms with many
foreign shareholders are less reluctant to adopt the committees system. In evidence, the
shares of committee firms with 30% or more and 15% or less of foreign shareholders are
7.27% and 0.75%, respectively.
Figure 6 illustrates board structure by industry sector. The sample is split into 17
industry sectors (firm observations for each sector in brackets): Foods (136), Energy
Resources (20), Construction & Materials (310), Raw Materials & Chemicals (286),
Pharmaceuticals (65), Automobiles & Transportation Equipment (116), Steel & Nonfer-
rous Metals (80), Machinery (230), Electrical Appliances & Precision Instruments (311),
IT & Services, Others (863), Electric Power & Gas (23), Transportation & Logistics
(113), Commercial & Wholesale Trade (319), Retail Trade (337), Banks (86), Financials
(excluding Banks) (83), and Real Estate (113). For each subsample, the black, gray,
and light gray parts represent the percentages of firms with the committees system,
Kansayaku firms with outsiders representing 30% or more of the board, and Kansayaku
firms with outsiders representing 15% or less of the board, respectively.
We find firms with the committees system across most of the industries except for
Foods and Energy Resources. In particular, Pharmaceuticals (6.15%), Banks (9.30%),
and Financials (excluding Banks) (12.05%) have much higher percentage shares of com-
mittee firms than the full sample (1.98%). Further, the Pharmaceutical and Financial
industries have higher percentage shares of Kansayaku firms with at least 30% outsiders
(33.85% and 39.76%, respectively) than the full sample (21.53%) and lower percentage
shares of Kansayaku firms with at most 15% outsiders (16.92% and 8.42%, respec-
tively) than the full sample (29.53%). Firms in these sectors are all engaged in highly
specialized businesses, even though each pharmaceutical firm certainly develops many
products. Accordingly, these firms may not need many insiders to collect inside infor-
mation, but prefer to have outsiders to obtain useful outside information. Similarly,
among Kansayaku firms, Energy Resources and Real Estate have high percentage shares
of firms with at least 30% outside directors (30.00% and 35.40%, respectively), and low
percentage shares of firms with at most 15% outsiders (10.00% and 18.58%, respec-
tively). In general, the Real Estate and Energy Resources (e.g., oil companies) sectors
are specialized, but not diversified. The IT & Services, Others sector also has relatively
many Kansayaku firms with at least 30% outsiders (29.42%). Although IT firms are also
involved in many projects, we usually find their businesses depend on core information
technology. Furthermore, IT firms hire many board outsiders because they may need
outside information to integrate their technology with other business fields.
In contrast, some industries have a large number of Kansayaku firms with few out-
siders and a small number of Kansayaku firms with many outsiders. The percentage
shares of Kansayaku firms with at most 15% outsiders for Construction & Materials, Raw
Materials & Chemicals, Automobiles & Transportation Equipment, Steel & Nonferrous
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Metals, and Machinery are 41.49%, 34.27%, 36.24%, 33.75%, and 25.65%, while the per-
centage shares of Kansayaku firms with at least 30% outsiders for these same industries
are 9.03%, 16.43%, 12.07%, 20.00%, and 15.65%, respectively. A common characteristic
of these industries is that firms use high technology skills to produce goods and services
and they are involved in many different projects. As those in each segmented business
unit possess very technical knowledge, it may be difficult for the CEO to understand
fully the firm’s entire business, and the board can possibly play an important role in
collecting inside information from each of these business units. For these industries,
the relative importance of inside information is quite high, although outside information
may also be important to expand their businesses into new areas. In addition, 33% of
Commercial & Wholesale Trade are Kansayaku firms with at most 15% outsiders, and
only 14.42% are Kansayaku firms with at least 30% outsiders. As many of these general
trading firms are involved in global businesses across a broad range of products and
services, their boards need a sufficient number of insiders to collect inside information
from each business unit.
However, inferences from casual observation of the data are not always consistent
with the model’s implications. For example, a relatively high percentage share of
Kansayaku firms (33.63%) in Transportation & Logistics hire few board outsiders and
only a relatively low percentage share of Kansayaku firms (15.93%) in this sector ap-
point many outside directors. This is somewhat counterintuitive in that this industry
is more or less specialized in transportation and generally has sufficient capacity to hire
outsiders. In addition, Electrical Appliances & Precision Instruments have similar char-
acteristics to Machinery in the sense that the firms in both industries produce many
different types of goods using high technology skills. However, in this industry, the
percentage share of Kansayaku firms with at most 15% outsiders (26.69%) is less than
that of the full sample, and the percentage share of Kansayaku firms with at least 30%
outsiders is close to that of the full sample. This result possibly implies that Japanese
large electronics firms, such as Sony and Hitachi, place more importance on acquiring











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper considers several situations in which shareholders optimally choose the board
that does not produce any outside information using the dual-role model of the board
of directors in Adams and Ferreira (2007). My model confirms that it is generally
optimal for shareholders to choose the informed board if the board has a large monitoring
intensity cost. In this case, there is sufficient communication between the CEO and the
board, and the informed board can remove the management bias associated with the
CEO’s decision, better advise the CEO, and if necessary, make a better project decision
by bringing outside information into the firm.
However, in some situations, an uninformed board that merely considers inside in-
formation already available within the firm becomes optimal. First, when the informed
board has a sufficiently small cost of monitoring intensity, both the good CEO who
observes inside information and the bad CEO who does not observe it are unwilling to
communicate with the informed board, as they are concerned about losing their decision-
making power. However, the bad CEO still has an incentive to communicate with the
“uninformed board,” and the shareholders optimally choose the uninformed board to
induce the bad CEO to reveal his project choice to the board. The uninformed board is
then likely chosen, especially when the probability of selecting the bad CEO is high and
the private information possessed by insiders is valuable. Second, board members may
want to be “active” monitors if they can obtain some private benefit from taking control
of the project decision. In particular, the informed board with a large private benefit
may overturn the CEO’s decision excessively and possibly make a worse decision than
the CEO, and thus the optimal board can be uninformed because it has less incentive to
oppose the CEO.18 Third, the shareholders’ cost associated with the conflict between the
board and the CEO can constrain shareholders in choosing the informed board. If the
shareholders incur a large cost sufficient to offset the advantages of hiring the informed
board, then the shareholders prefer the uninformed board, which has less incentive to
reject the CEO’s decision. Fourth, if a firm is involved in many businesses, especially if
it is a “silo” company in which each business department does not share enough infor-
mation with the others, each insider is likely to have a small piece of inside information
about the firm’s entire business.19 Then, the board may face a difficulty in finding a
CEO with a sufficient amount of inside information. In such a situation, the board can
play an important role in collecting inside information by appointing some insiders from
each business unit to the board and helping the CEO use this information during the
decision-making process. It can indeed then be optimal for a diversified firm to select
the uninformed board with many insiders, as the board with many outsiders may fail to
produce enough inside information, even if it can observe outside information.20 This
18Boards of Japanese firms may have a small private benefit because the market for independent
directors does not function well in Japan.
19If employees of a company have a silo mentality, or an introversive mind-set that prohibits them
from communicating with others, we would expect to see similar effects.
20The diversified firm can possibly obtain both inside and outside information by implementing a large
board. However, it may take a longer time to gather the collective opinions of board members as board
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is especially so when the magnitude of firm diversification is large, the firm needs many
outsiders to obtain useful outside information, and the inside information is valuable.
In recent years, Japanese firms have been increasing the number of outsiders on their
boards, even while using the Kansayaku system instead of the committees system. We
can at least partly understand this in that under the Kansayaku system, outside directors
have a relatively large cost of monitoring intensity, and as a result, Japanese firms can
easily hire additional outside board members to obtain outside information without
worrying about miscommunication between the CEO and the board. In addition, the
fact that firms with a greater number of foreign shareholders tend to have more outside
board members can be explained by the implications of the model if foreign shareholders
have greater tolerance for disagreement between the CEO and the board than do typical
Japanese shareholders. Furthermore, consistent with some of the implications, highly
specialized firms such as financial, real estate, and pharmaceutical firms tend to have a
greater number of outside directors than do diversified firms such as chemical, machinery,
and automobile firms that utilize technical skills to produce many different goods and
services.
Although casual observations of data are important steps to linking the implications
of the model to actual corporate governance, empirical procedures controlling for various
other factors (e.g., the CEO’s and the board’s private benefit, management bias, and the
importance of inside and outside information) are necessary to investigate the model’s
predictions more precisely. As for future research, as far as I am aware, an examination
of the relationship between firm diversification and board structure based on the impli-
cations of my model would be new to the literature. Past studies (e.g., Coles, Danile,
and Naveen (2008)) generally argue that more diversified firms have a greater need for
advice and thus hire more independent directors.21 Beside the choice of board, there
are also other empirical implications regarding the board’s monitoring intensity and the
CEO’s decision to communicate with the board. In my model, the board monitors inten-
sively when the monitoring cost is small, when the board’s private benefit or the CEO’s
managerial bias is large, when it is informed about the CEO’s project choice, when the
CEO does not have inside information, and when the board itself can observe outside
information. Regarding communication, the model predicts that managerial bias and
the CEO’s private benefit discourage the CEO from consulting with the board, while
the board’s private benefit encourages the CEO to communicate with the board. In
addition, inside and outside information can exert different effects on the behavior of
good and bad CEOs. When the outside information is valuable, both good and bad
CEOs seek advice from outside board members. However, when the inside information
is valuable, the bad CEO seeks advice from the board but the good CEO does not.
size becomes larger, and thus adopting a large board including both insiders and outsiders is not costless.
21Other studies including Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007), Dahya and McConnell (2007),
Duchin et al. (2010), Ferreira et al. (2011), Guest (2008), Linck et al. (2008), and Masulis and Mobbs
(2011) also use business segments as a proxy for the magnitude of firm diversification in their studies.
Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2000), for instance, investigate 199 NYSE/AMEX firms from
1985 to 1994 and find that multiple-segment firms have larger boards and, contrary to our implications,
more outside directors than do single-segment firms.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: The good CEO reveals θ to the informed board if:
EUHG(j = θ; IH)−EUHG(j = ∅; IH) = (σ2a−σ2 )+IH(σ2+σ2p)(σ2−σ2p−b+d) ≥ 0. (43)
This condition holds for all IH ∈ (0, 1] if σ2 − σ2p − b + d ≥ 0. If σ2 − σ2p − b + d < 0,







p+b−σ2−d) . Thus the good CEO reveals θ if
IH ≤ I∗ and does not reveal it if I∗ < IH .
The bad CEO reveals θ to the informed board if:









η − b+ d) ≥ 0. (44)
This condition holds for all IH ∈ (0, 1] if σ2 + σ2η − b+ d ≥ 0. If σ2 + σ2η − b+ d < 0, this





η)(b−σ2−σ2η−d) and does not hold otherwise. Thus the
bad CEO reveals θ if IH ≤ I∗∗ and does not reveal it if I∗∗ < IH .
Because I∗ ≤ I∗∗, the good CEO never reveals θ when the bad CEO does not reveal
it. Thus the equilibrium is state (E1) if IH ≤ I∗, state (E2) if I∗ < IH ≤ I∗∗, or state
(E3) if I∗∗ < IH . 2
Proof of Proposition 3: The good CEO does not reveal θ to the uninformed board
because, with the condition b ≥ d:
EULG(j = θ; IL)− EULG(j = ∅; IL) = ILσ2p(d− b− σ2p) < 0, (45)
holds for all IL ∈ (0, 1].
The bad CEO reveals θ to the uninformed board if:
EULB(j = θ; IL)− EULB(j = ∅; IL) = (σ2p − σ2η) + ILσ2η(σ2η − b+ d) ≥ 0. (46)
This condition holds for all IL ∈ (0, 1] if σ2η − b+ d ≥ 0. If σ2η − b+ d < 0, this condition
holds only if IH ≤ σ
2
p−σ2η
σ2η(b−σ2η−d) and does not hold otherwise. Thus the bad CEO reveals
θ if IL ≤ I∗∗∗, and the equilibrium state is (E4) if IL ≤ I∗∗∗ or (E5) if I∗∗∗ < IL. 2
Proof of Proposition 4: (a) In states (E1, E4) and (E1, E5), the following inequalities
hold for all the parameter values.
E(US(E1))− E(US(E4)) = q[(σ2a − σ2 ) + IH(σ2 + 2g2)2 + IHd(σ2 + 2g2)− IL(2g2 − σ2p)2






2)− IL(σ2η + 2g2)2 − ILd(σ2η + 2g2)]
≥ 0, (47)
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E(US(E1))− E(US(E5)) = q[(σ2a − σ2 ) + IH(σ2 + 2g2 + d)(σ2 + 2g2)






2 + d)(σ2 + σ
2
η + 2g
2)− IL(σ2η + d)2g2]
≥ 0. (48)
Therefore, the shareholders always choose the informed board.
(b) In state (E2, E4), the shareholders choose the informed board if:
E(US(E2))− E(US(E4)) = q[(IH − IL)(2g2 − σ2p)(2g2 − σ2p + d)]
+ (1− q)[(σ2a − σ2 ) + IH(σ2 + σ2η + 2g2)2 + IHd(σ2 + σ2η + 2g2)
− IL(σ2η + 2g2)2 − ILd(σ2η + 2g2)] ≥ 0. (49)
If q(IH−IL)(2g2−σ2p)+(1−q)(IH(σ2+σ2η+2g2)−IL(σ2η+2g2)) ≥ 0, the above condition
is satisfied for all the parameter values. If not, the above condition is translated into:
d ≤ 1−q(IH − IL)(2g2 − σ2p)− (1− q)(IH(σ2 + σ2η + 2g2)− IL(σ2η + 2g2))






2)2 − IL(σ2η + 2g2)2]. (50)
We let d∗(E2,E4) be equal to the right-hand side of this equation if its denominator
takes a nonnegative value and ∞ otherwise. Then, the informed (uninformed) board is
chosen if d ≤ d∗(E2,E4) (d > d∗(E2,E4)).
Similarly, in states (E2, E5) and (E3, E5), we define d∗(·,·) as:
d∗(E2,E5) =
1
−q(IH − IL)(2g2 − σ2p)− (1− q)(IH(σ2 + σ2η + 2g2)− 2ILg2)






2)2 − 4ILg4}], (51)
if the denominator is nonnegative and ∞ otherwise, and
d∗(E3,E5) =
q(IH − IL)(2g2 − σ2p)2 + (1− q)(IH − IL)4g4
−q(IH − IL)(2g2 − σ2p)− (1− q)(IH − IL)2g2
, (52)
if the denominator is nonnegative and ∞ otherwise. Then the informed (uninformed)
board is chosen if d ≤ d∗((·),(·)) (d > d∗((·),(·))).
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(c) In state (E3, E4), the uninformed board is chosen if:
E(US(E3))− E(US(E4)) = q[(IH − IL)(2g2 − σ2p)(2g2 − σ2p + d)]
+ (1− q)[(σ2η − σ2p) + IH2g2(2g2 + d)
− IL(σ2η + d+ 2g2)(σ2η + 2g2)] < 0, (53)
and the informed board is chosen otherwise. If I ≡ IH = IL, the above condition is
reduced to E(US(E3))−E(US(E4)) = (1− q)[(σ2η −σ2p)− Iσ2η(σ2η +4g2+ d)] < 0, which
holds for all the parameter values. 2
Proof of Proposition 5: In state (E1, E4), the informed board is chosen if:
E(US(E1))− E(US(E4)) = F − c[q(IH(σ2 + 2g2 + d)− IL(2g2 − σ2p + d))
+ (1− q)(IH(σ2 + σ2η + 2g2 + d)− IL(σ2η + 2g2 + d))]
≥ 0. (54)
where F ≥ 0 is E(US(E1))−E(US(E4)) of the basic model (see the proof of Proposition
4). This condition is rearranged for c as:
c ≤ F × [q(IH(σ2 + 2g2 + d)− IL(2g2 − σ2p + d))
+ (1− q)(IH(σ2 + σ2η + 2g2 + d)− IL(σ2η + 2g2 + d))]−1. (55)
Thus, by letting the right-hand side be c∗(E1,E4), the informed (uninformed) board is
chosen when c ≤ c∗(E1,E4) (c > c∗(E1,E4)).
Similarly, in state (E1, E5), we set:
c∗((E1),(E5)) = G× [q(IH(σ2 + 2g2 + d)− IL(2g2 + d− σ2p))
+ (1− q)(IH(σ2 + σ2η + 2g2 + d)− IL(2g2 + d))]−1. (56)
where G ≥ 0 is E(US(E1)) − E(US(E5)) of the basic model. Then, the informed
(uninformed) board is chosen when c ≤ c∗((E1),(E5)) (c > c∗((E1),(E5))). 2
Proof of Proposition 6: We use the following results:
E((yHa − a˜)2 + (yHp − p˜)2|j = θ) = E((a− a˜)2 + (r(p1 − p˜1) + (1− r)(E(p˜2)− p˜2))2|j = θ)
= (1− r)2σ2p, (57)
E((yGa − a˜)2 + (yGp − p˜)2|j = θ) = σ2 + 2g2, (58)
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− p˜1 − g) +
+ (1− r)(E(p˜2)− p˜2 − g)
}2|p˜1 ∈ [pi+1, pi])]
= σ2 + r
2σ2η + (1− r)2σ2p + 2g2. (59)
In states (E1, E4) and (E2, E4), the uninformed board is optimal if:
E(US(E1))− E(US(E4)) = q[(σ2a − σ2 ) + IH(σ2 + 2g2 + d− (1− r)2σ2p)(2g2 − σ2 − (1− r)2σ2p)
− IL(2g2 + d− σ2p)(2g2 − σ2p)]





2 + d)(σ2 + r
2σ2η + 2g
2)
− IL(σ2η + 2g2 + d)(σ2η + 2g2)] < 0, (60)
and
E(US(E2))− E(US(E4)) = q[IH(2g2 + d− σ2p)(2g2 − σ2p)− IL(2g2 + d− σ2p)(2g2 − σ2p)]





2 + d)(σ2 + r
2σ2η + 2g
2)
− IL(σ2η + 2g2 + d)(σ2η + 2g2)] < 0. (61)
By letting r = 1, we can verify that E(US(E1)) − E(US(E4)) and E(US(E2)) −
E(US(E4)) become the same equations as those in the basic model and thus the unin-
formed board is not chosen in state (E1, E4) and also in state (E2, E4) if d ≤ d∗(E2,E4).
By letting N ↑ ∞ and α ↓ 0, for both (E1, E4) and (E2, E4), we can derive the same
condition:
(σ2a − σ2 ) − (σ2p − σ2η) + IHσ2 (σ2 + 2g2)
− ILσ2η(σ2η + 2g2) + (IH − IL)(2g2 + d)(2g2 + σ2 + σ2η) < 0 (62)
for selecting the uninformed board. 2
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